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I. INTRODUCTION

Slaughterhouse Cases,1 Bradwell v. Illinois,2 and Cruikshank v.
United States,3 which were all decided between 1873 and 1876, were the
first cases in which the Supreme Court interpreted the 14th Amendment.
The reasoning and holdings of the Supreme Court in those cases have
affected constitutional interpretation in ways which are both profound
and unfortunate. The conclusions that the Court drew about the meaning
of the 14th Amendment shortly after its adoption were contrary to the
intent of the framers of that Amendment and a betrayal of the sacrifices
which had been made by the people of that period. In each case, the
Court perverted the meaning of the Constitution in ways that reverberate
down to the present day.
In these cases the Court ruled upon several critical aspects of 14th
Amendment jurisprudence, including (1) Whether the 14th Amendment
prohibits the States from interfering with our fundamental rights; (2)
How the equality of different groups should be determined; and (3) How

* B.A. Yale University, 1972; J.D. Cornell Law School, 1977; C. Blake McDowell, Jr., Professor of
Law, University of Akron School of Law. I wish to thank Richard Aynes and Elizabeth Reilly both
for their friendship and for their guidance in the study of constitutional law.
1. 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
2. 83 U.S. 130 (1873).
3. 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
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much power Congress has to protect the civil and political rights of
American citizens – in particular, whether the 14th Amendment
authorizes Congress to enact legislation to prevent mobs or other private
individuals from violating people’s fundamental rights. The Court
narrowly construed the constitutional principles of liberty, equality, and
the power of Congress to protect civil rights.
II. SLAUGHTERHOUSE CASES
In Slaughterhouse Cases the Supreme Court came to a
commonsense result – the Court upheld a law that concentrated all of the
butchering business in the City of New Orleans to a location south of the
city limits in an area controlled by a state-created monopoly.4 The Court
found the law to be a constitutional exercise of the police power of the
State, a reasonable regulation protecting the public health.5 And the
Court could have rested its opinion solely upon this finding, as even the
Lochner Court would likely have upheld the law on those grounds.6 But
the Slaughterhouse Court went much further. In doing so, the Court
practically eviscerated the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the 14th
Amendment.
The Supreme Court ruled in Slaughterhouse that the butchers had
no constitutional claim under the 14th Amendment against the law
because the constitutional right that they were asserting – the right to
earn a living at an honest occupation – although a fundamental right,
was not a “privilege or immunity of national citizenship” within the
meaning of the 14th Amendment.7 The key to the reasoning of the Court
on this point was that there is a distinction between state citizenship and
national citizenship. The Court stated, “[i]t is quite clear, then, that there

4. See Slaughterhouse, 83 U.S. at 59-63 (setting forth and upholding the Louisiana statute
creating the monopoly and designating the area where butchering could occur).
5. See id. at 61-65 (discussing the “police power” of the state to enact laws protective of the
public health); id. at 63 (“The regulation of the place and manner of conducting the slaughtering of
animals, and the business of butchering within a city, and the inspection of the animals to be killed
for meat, and of the meat afterwards, are among the most necessary and frequent exercises of this
power.”).
6. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 61 (1905) (striking down a law prohibiting bakers
from working more than sixty hours per week). The Court stated:
[W]e think that such a law as this, although passed in the assumed exercise of the police
power, and as relating to the public health, or the health of the employees named, is not
within that power, and is invalid. The act is not, within any fair meaning of the term, a
health law, but is an illegal interference with the rights of individuals . . . .
Id.
7. Slaughterhouse, 83 U.S. at 73-74.
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is a citizenship of the United States, and a citizenship of a State, which
are distinct from each other, and which depend upon different
characteristics or circumstances in the individual.”8 The Court then
reasoned that our fundamental rights do not arise from the fact of
American citizenship; rather they arise from our status as citizens of the
several states.9 In reaching this conclusion the Court relied upon a pre14th Amendment case, Corfield v. Coryell,10 in which Judge Bushrod
Washington had defined the privileges and immunities of citizens of the
several states as being “those privileges and immunities which are, in
their nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens of all
free governments; and which have, at all times, been enjoyed by citizens
of the several States which compose this Union, from the time of their
becoming free, independent, and sovereign,”11 and as including at least
the following: “Protection by the government; the enjoyment of life and
liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and
to pursue and obtain happiness and safety.”12
Citing Corfield, the Slaughterhouse Court identified our
“fundamental” rights in the following terms:
The description, when taken to include others not named, but which
are of the same general character, embraces nearly every civil right for
the establishment and protection of which organized government is
instituted. They are, in the language of Judge Washington, those rights
which the [sic] fundamental. Throughout his opinion, they are spoken
of as rights belonging to the individual as a citizen of a State. They are
so spoken of in the constitutional provision which he was construing.
And they have always been held to be the class of rights which the
State governments were created to establish and secure.13

The Slaughterhouse Court asked rhetorically, “[w]as it the purpose
of the fourteenth amendment [sic], by the simple declaration that no
State should make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
and immunities of citizens of the United States, to transfer the security
and protection of all the civil rights which we have mentioned, from the
States to the Federal government?”14 To the majority of the Court, the

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
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Id. at 74.
Id. at 74-76.
6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
Id. at 551, quoted in Slaughterhouse, 83 U.S. at 76.
Id. at 551-52, quoted in Slaughterhouse, 83 U.S. at 76.
Slaughterhouse, 83 U.S. at 76.
Id. at 77.
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answer was “No,” but legal scholars almost unanimously agree with the
four dissenters that the Court answered that question wrong.15
In reaching this result the Court ignored the straightforward
language of the 14th Amendment. The first words of the Amendment
state:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States . . . .16

The Framers of the 14th Amendment made state citizenship
secondary to national citizenship. They provided that all persons born in
the United States are American citizens, and that Americans are citizens
of whatever state they happen to reside in. Yet in Slaughterhouse the
Supreme Court turned that unmistakable hierarchy on its head, and as a
result they consigned the fundamental freedoms that Americans
rightfully regard as their birthright to the dubious protection of the
States. After Slaughterhouse all of our fundamental rights – freedom of
speech, freedom of the press, freedom of religion, freedom of assembly,
and all of the other privileges and immunities set forth in the Bill of
Rights, as well as all of our unenumerated rights, would thenceforward
be subject to the whims and prejudices of state constitutions, state laws,
state and local police, state courts, and state juries.
In placing state citizenship over national citizenship, the
Slaughterhouse Court reflected the view of John C. Calhoun. In 1833,
Calhoun had equated the idea of a citizen of the United States to a
“citizen of the world, . . . a perfect nondescript,”17 and stated that our

15. Id. at 78. See Richard L. Aynes, Constricting the Law of Freedom: Justice Miller, the
Fourteenth Amendment, and the Slaughter-House Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 627, 627-29 (1994)
(collecting views of scholars on the Slaughterhouse Court’s interpretation of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
17. See 2 THE WORKS OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 242 (Richard Krenner Crallé ed.) (1888). In
objecting to the Revenue Bill pending before the Senate, Calhoun said:
In what manner are we citizens of the United States? Without weakening the patriotic
feeling with which, I trust, it will ever be uttered. If by citizen of the United States he
means a citizen at large, one whose citizenship extends to the entire geographical limits
of the country, without having a local citizenship in some State or territory, a sort of
citizen of the world, all I have to say is, that such a citizen would be a perfect
nondescript; that not a single individual of this description can be found in the entire
mass of our population.
Id. at 242-43.
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rights depend upon being the citizen of a State or territory.18 Dissenting
in Slaughterhouse, Justice Stephen J. Field excoriated the majority for
adopting Calhoun’s view of the relative importance of state and national
citizenship.19 In the words of Charles L. Black, Jr., the Slaughterhouse
Court “surrendered to Calhoun.”20 Black explains:
The fact (an amazing one in view of the intervening great Civil War
for national unity), is that, on the level of our highest values, this
Slaughterhouse holding is a very close fit with the banefully “classic”
doctrines of John C. Calhoun, the great heresiarch, on the relative
importance and worth of national citizenship (not very much) and state
21
citizenship (nearly everything).

Even more seriously, the reasoning of the Court in Slaughterhouse
making our fundamental rights dependent upon state citizenship and
state institutions allowed future segregationists to base their political
philosophy upon the theory of “states’ rights.” George Wallace could
not have argued, in his January 1963 inauguration address as Governor
of Alabama, that he had the power to protect and defend “segregation
today . . . segregation tomorrow . . . segregation forever”22 unless he
believed that such a question was a matter of state citizenship.
18. See id. at 243. Calhoun stated:
Notwithstanding all the pomp and display of eloquence on the occasion, every citizen is
a citizen of some State or territory, and, as such, under an express provision of the
constitution, is entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States;
and it is in this, and in no other sense, that we are citizens of the United States.
Id. at 243.
19. See Slaughterhouse, 83 U.S. at 95 (Field, J., dissenting).
20. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM 32 (1997).
21. Id. More colorfully, Black stated:
This denial to each of the States of the right to choose its own citizens might be looked
on now as just another nail in the coffin of the theory that our states are “sovereign.”
That coffin can use all the nails it can get, because it yawns every now and then, on some
inauspicious midnight, to give up its undead, clad perhaps in the senatorial toga of
Calhoun.
Id. at 24.
22. See George C. Wallace, Governor, 1963 Inaugural Address (Jan. 14, 1963), available at
http://www.archives.state.al.us/govs_list/inauguralspeech.html. Governor Wallace said:
Today I have stood, where once Jefferson Davis stood, and took an oath to my people. It
is very appropriate then that from this Cradle of the Confederacy, this very Heart of the
Great Anglo-Saxon Southland, that today we sound the drum for freedom as have our
generations of forebears before us done, time and time again through history. Let us rise
to the call of freedom-loving blood that is in us and send our answer to the tyranny that
clanks its chains upon the South. In the name of the greatest people that have ever trod
this earth, I draw the line in the dust and toss the gauntlet before the feet of tyranny . . .
and I say . . . segregation today . . . segregation tomorrow . . . segregation forever.
Id.
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Similarly, three months later, those who denounced the civil rights
activities of Martin Luther King, Jr., and other members of the Southern
Christian Leadership Conference in Birmingham, Alabama, as the work
of “outsiders,”23 relied upon the implicit belief that only Alabama
institutions had the right and the power to address matters of
constitutional importance in the State of Alabama.
Here is a portion of King’s response to this argument:
I am cognizant of the interrelatedness of all communities and states. I
cannot sit idly by in Atlanta and not be concerned about what happens
in Birmingham. Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.
We are caught in an inescapable network of mutuality, tied in a single
garment of destiny. Whatever affects one directly, affects all
indirectly. Never again can we afford to live with the narrow,
provincial “outside agitator” idea. Anyone who lives inside the United
States can never be considered an outsider anywhere within its
bounds.24

Whether it be Daniel Worth circulating Hinton Helper’s Impending
Crisis25 or Viola Liuzzo responding to the events at Edmond Pettus

23. See Statement by Alabama Clergymen on Racial Problems in Alabama (Apr. 12, 1963),
available at http://www.stanford.edu/group/King/frequentdocs/clergy.pdf (“We are now confronted
by a series of demonstrations by some of our Negro citizens, directed and led in part by outsiders.”).
24. See Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from a Birmingham Jail (Apr. 16, 1963), available at
http://www.mlkonline.net/jail.html. King continued:
I think I should indicate why I am here in Birmingham, since you have been influenced
by the view which argues against “outsiders coming in.” I have the honor of serving as
president of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, an organization operating in
every southern state, with headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia. We have some eighty five
affiliated organizations across the South, and one of them is the Alabama Christian
Movement for Human Rights. Frequently we share staff, educational and financial
resources with our affiliates. Several months ago the affiliate here in Birmingham asked
us to be on call to engage in a nonviolent direct action program if such were deemed
necessary. We readily consented, and when the hour came we lived up to our promise.
So I, along with several members of my staff, am here because I was invited here. I am
here because I have organizational ties here.
But more basically, I am in Birmingham because injustice is here. Just as the prophets
of the eighth century B.C. left their villages and carried their “thus saith the Lord” far
beyond the boundaries of their home towns, and just as the Apostle Paul left his village
of Tarsus and carried the gospel of Jesus Christ to the far corners of the Greco-Roman
world, so am I compelled to carry the gospel of freedom beyond my own home town.
Like Paul, I must constantly respond to the Macedonian call for aid.
Id.
25. See MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, “THE PEOPLE’S DARLING PRIVILEGE”:
STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY 289-95 (2000) (describing the
trials and convictions of Daniel Worth in North Carolina for circulating Helper’s anti-slavery book,
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Bridge,26 Americans have both the right and the moral duty to protest
fundamental injustice anywhere in the United States, because these are
matters of national citizenship, not state citizenship. Yet even today, the
misconception that the States should have the final word in defining our
fundamental rights holds influence in some quarters. During the recent
presidential campaign, in an interview with veteran television journalist
Katie Couric, Republican Vice-Presidential nominee Governor Sarah
Palin expresses both her belief in the right to privacy and her
understanding that the parameters of that right should be determined by
the individual states:
Couric: Do you think there’s an inherent right to privacy in the
Constitution?
Palin: I do. Yeah, I do.
Couric: The cornerstone of Roe v. Wade.
Palin: I do. And I believe that individual states can best handle what
the people within the different constituencies in the 50 states would
like to see their will ushered in an issue like that.27

The immediate and principal consequence of the Court’s ruling in
Slaughterhouse was to remove the Privileges and Immunities Clause as
the safe harbor of our fundamental rights. But Americans proved
reluctant to believe that the Constitution afforded no remedy when the
States violate fundamental rights. The task of preserving our substantive
rights against state injustice eventually fell to the Due Process Clause of
the 14th Amendment. Later in the 19th century, the Supreme Court
turned to the Due Process Clause as the textual home of our fundamental
rights. As semantically awkward and historically inaccurate as the
choice of the Due Process Clause was, the word “liberty” nevertheless
shone brightly there, and the Court began the long, slow process of
“incorporating” our substantive fundamental rights into the Fourteenth

events that Curtis calls “a crucial part of the background of the much disputed history of the
Fourteenth Amendment”).
26. See generally MARY STANTON, FROM SELMA TO SORROW: THE LIFE AND DEATH OF
VIOLA LIUZZO (1998) (describing the life of a Detroit housewife who was killed in Alabama in
March 1965, as a result of her civil rights activities).
27. Interview by Katie Couric with Joe Biden and Sarah Palin, U.S. Vice-Presidential
Nominees, (Oct. 1, 2008), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/10/01
/eveningnews/main4493062.shtml.
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Amendment – defining the nature and the scope of the rights that are
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”28
Supreme Court Justices have rightfully objected that neither the text
nor the history of the Due Process Clause justifies the theory of
“substantive due process.” For example, in Griswold v. Connecticut
Justice Potter Stewart dissented for the following reason:
We are told that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
is not, as such, the “guide” in this case. With that much I agree. There
is no claim that this law [prohibiting the use of birth control], duly
enacted by the Connecticut Legislature, is unconstitutionally vague.
There is no claim that the appellants were denied any of the elements
of procedural due process at their trial, so as to make their convictions
constitutionally invalid. And, as the Court says, the day has long
passed since the Due Process Clause was regarded as a proper
instrument for determining “the wisdom, need, and propriety” of state
laws.29

Eight years later in Roe v. Wade Justice Stewart changed his view
and recognized the doctrine of substantive process,30 yet even today,
some justices still maintain the illegitimacy of the concept. For
example, Justice Antonin Scalia has stated his belief that the Due
Process Clause protects only procedural, not substantive rights: “The
text of the Due Process Clause does not protect individuals against
deprivations of liberty simpliciter. It protects them against deprivations
of liberty ‘without due process of law.’”31
In hindsight it should not be surprising that the first substantive due
process right recognized by the Supreme Court a century ago was

28. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1937) (Cardozo, J.) (“In these and other
situations immunities that are valid as against the federal government by force of the specific
pledges of particular amendments have been found to be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,
and thus, through the Fourteenth Amendment, become valid as against the states.”).
29. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 528 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
30. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 167-68 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring). Speaking of the
Court’s decision in Griswold striking down a Connecticut law making it unlawful to use birth
control, Justice Stewart stated:
[I]t was clear to me then, and it is equally clear to me now, that the Griswold decision
can be rationally understood only as a holding that the Connecticut statute substantively
invaded the ‘liberty’ that is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. As so understood, Griswold stands as one in a long line of pre-Skrupa
cases decided under the doctrine of substantive due process, and I now accept it as such.
Id. at 167-68.
31. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 293 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
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“liberty of contract.”32 In this individualistic nation of self-sufficient
farmers and tradesmen, where government regulation was largely
unknown, with a frontier that took three centuries to move from the
beachheads along the Atlantic coast to the interior of Alaska – a frontier
where the existence of government itself was barely felt – in this country
of small farmers, ranchers, small businessmen, and adventurers, we
might rationally expect an economic philosophy of laissez faire to arise.
That it did not disappear with the erection of mills in Lawrence and
Lowell, or even the rise of the robber barons, is testament to the fact that
values emerge from the society in which they are born and they do not
necessarily die with that society – they may live on past their appointed
time.33 “Liberty of contract” did not expire until 1937 at the height of
the Great Depression and the commencement of Roosevelt’s second
term.34
What is surprising – what should be surprising – is that the
Supreme Court took so long to recognize and protect the non-economic
political and social rights of American citizens. Even the specific
provisions of the Bill of Rights listing the privileges and immunities of
criminal defendants were not automatically applied against the States by

32. See Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 591 (1897) (striking down a Louisiana statute
attempting to regulate the sale of insurance by a New York company and stating, “In the privilege
of pursuing an ordinary calling or trade, and of acquiring, holding, and selling property, must be
embraced the right to make all proper contracts in relation thereto.”); see also BERNARD
SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 179-82 (1993) (describing “Due Process and
Liberty of Contract”).
33. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 861-64
(1992) (discussing how it was proper for the Court to overrule the doctrines of “separate but equal”
and “liberty of contract” in light of new facts or new understandings of fact). The Court stated:
West Coast Hotel and Brown each rested on facts, or an understanding of facts, changed
from those which furnished the claimed justifications for the earlier constitutional
resolutions. Each case was comprehensible as the Court’s response to facts that the
country could understand, or had come to understand already, but which the Court of an
earlier day, as its own declarations disclosed, had not been able to perceive. As the
decisions were thus comprehensible they were also defensible, not merely as the
victories of one doctrinal school over another by dint of numbers (victories though they
were), but as applications of constitutional principle to facts as they had not been seen by
the Court before. In constitutional adjudication as elsewhere in life, changed
circumstances may impose new obligations, and the thoughtful part of the Nation could
accept each decision to overrule a prior case as a response to the Court's constitutional
duty.
Id. at 863-64.
34. See West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937) (“In each case the violation
alleged by those attacking minimum wage regulation for women is deprivation of freedom of
contract. What is this freedom? The Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract.”).
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the Court, as the Framers of the 14th Amendment so clearly intended.35
Instead, the Court took decades to decide whether each of those specific
guarantees should be considered inherent to 14th Amendment Due
Process. Ever so slowly, the Court came to recognize that the States, no
less than the United States government, should be obedient to the right
to counsel,36 the right to silence,37 the right to a speedy trial,38 the right to
a trial by jury,39 and freedom from unreasonable or warrantless
searches.40
The Court labored even longer to begin defining the enumerated
and unenumerated substantive rights of personal autonomy, what the
Declaration of Independence calls “the pursuit of happiness,”41 and that
is protected by the word “liberty” in the Constitution.42 The Supreme
Court first struck down a law because it interfered with the rights of

35. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 71-72 (1948) (Black, J., dissenting) (contending
that one of the chief purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment was to make the Bill of Rights
applicable against the States, and assembling historical evidence in support of that proposition); see
also MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE
BILL OF RIGHTS (1986).
36. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (Sixth Amendment right to counsel).
37. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (Fifth Amendment right to be free of compelled
self-incrimination).
38. See Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (Sixth Amendment right to a speedy
and public trial).
39. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial).
40. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures and the right to have illegally seized evidence excluded from
evidence at trial).
41. In a number of decisions from different eras, the Supreme Court has echoed the language
of the Declaration. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176 (1803) (“That the people have an
original right to establish, for their future government, such principles as, in their opinion, shall
most conduce to their own happiness, is the basis on which the whole American fabric has been
erected.”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (“While this Court has not attempted to
define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed, the term has received much consideration and
some of the included things have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely
freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the
common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up
children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy
those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by
free men.”); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (“The freedom to marry has long been
recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men.”).
42. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992)
(O’Connor, Souter & Kennedy, JJ.) (basing the right to privacy on the word “liberty” in the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, stating “[t]he controlling word in the cases before us
is ‘liberty’”).
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parents to raise their children in 1923.43 The Court first enforced the
First Amendment’s prohibition on laws abridging freedom of speech and
freedom of the press in 1931.44 The Supreme Court first upheld a
person’s right to freedom of religion in 1940.45 The Supreme Court first
defended a person’s freedom of procreation in 1942.46 The right to
contraception followed in 1965,47 the right to marriage in 1967,48 a
woman’s right to terminate a pregnancy in 1973,49 the right to live with
extended family in 1977,50 and the right to die in 1990.51 Why did it
take so long for the Court to recognize these rights? Why did it take
until 2003 for a majority of the Supreme Court to announce the simple,
straightforward principle that people have the right to make “intimate
and personal choices” involving sex, marriage, raising children, and
living arrangements?52 The answer to that question depends not only
upon an understanding of Slaughterhouse, but an understanding of
Bradwell as well. I now turn to that case.

43. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (striking down Nebraska law prohibiting the
teaching of foreign languages in the lower grades).
44. See Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) (reversing conviction of defendant
charged with violating a California statute that prohibited displaying a red flag as an emblem of
opposition to organized government); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (striking down
Minnesota law which authorized the issuance of an injunction against the publication of defamatory
newspapers).
45. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (reversing defendant’s conviction for
breach of the peace for playing a phonograph record expressing his religious beliefs).
46. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (striking down Oklahoma mandatory
sterilization law for “habitual criminals”).
47. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (striking down Connecticut law
prohibiting the use of birth control).
48. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down Virginia law criminalizing
interracial marriage).
49. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (striking down Texas law prohibiting abortion
except to save the life of the woman).
50. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (striking down city ordinance
narrowly defining the classes of family members who may live together in a home located in an area
zoned for “single-family” residences).
51. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (recognizing the right
of a competent adult to refuse lifesaving medical treatment).
52. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (Kennedy, J.) (“These matters,
involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to
personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”
(quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)
(O’Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.))).
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III. BRADWELL V. ILLINOIS
The Court decided Bradwell the same day as Slaughterhouse, and
the reasoning in Bradwell relied upon and reinforced the legal theories
developed in Slaughterhouse. But unlike Slaughterhouse, in Bradwell
the Supreme Court came to an unjust result.
Myra Bradwell was an accomplished legal publisher who stood for
the bar in the State of Illinois.53 The Illinois Supreme Court rejected her
application on the ground that she was a woman even though the state
statute governing admission to the bar referred to “persons” and made no
distinction upon gender lines.54 The Illinois Supreme Court ruled that
the law had been intended to permit only men, and not women, to enter
the legal profession,55 and it turned down Bradwell’s application to be a
lawyer.56
On appeal, the majority of the United States Supreme Court noted
that Bradwell had no claim under the Privileges and Immunities Clause
because, as the Court had just ruled in Slaughterhouse, her right to earn
a living was a fundamental right under state law, not national law, and
accordingly she must look to the State of Illinois for redress of that
right.57
It may be surprising to modern readers that the Court did not
specifically discuss Bradwell’s rights under the Equal Protection Clause.
However, the Court had discussed Equal Protection in Slaughterhouse,
and it incorporated its reasoning from Slaughterhouse into its opinion in
Bradwell.58 In Slaughterhouse the Court found “the one pervading
purpose” of the 14th Amendment to be the protection of “the freedom of

53. See Richard L. Aynes, Bradwell v. Illinois: Chief Justice’s Dissent and the “Sphere of
Women’s Work,” 59 LA. L. REV. 521, 525 (1999); see also id. at 537-38 (constructing a dissenting
opinion that Chief Justice Salmon Chase might have written in Bradwell in light of his values and
the role that his daughter played in his life and career).
54. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 131-33 (1873).
55. Id. at 132-33.
56. Id.
57. See id. at 139. The Court stated:
The opinion just delivered in the Slaughter-House Cases renders elaborate argument in
the present case unnecessary; for, unless we are wholly and radically mistaken in the
principles on which those cases are decided, the right to control and regulate the granting
of license to practice law in the courts of a State is one of those powers which are not
transferred for its protection to the Federal government, and its exercise is in no manner
governed or controlled by citizenship of the United States in the party seeking such
license.
Id.
58. See id. (“It is unnecessary to repeat the argument on which the judgment in
[Slaughterhouse Cases] is founded. It is sufficient to say they are conclusive of the present case.”).
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the slave race.”59 The Court expressed the opinion that Framers
intended the Equal Protection Clause to protect African-Americans – but
no other groups – from discrimination:
We doubt very much whether any action of a State not directed by way
of discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their
race, will ever be held to come within the purview of this provision. It
is so clearly a provision for that race and that emergency, that a strong
case would be necessary for its application to any other.60

Accordingly, the majority in Bradwell relied entirely upon the
Court’s reasoning in Slaughterhouse in rejecting Bradwell’s 14th
Amendment claim.
Justice Joseph P. Bradley’s concurring opinion in Bradwell,
however, articulated a different legal theory which has affected
constitutional analysis ever since. Bradley concluded that the inequality
of women is not simply a matter of the law of Illinois or even the law of
man – it is the law of God.61 In a passage from his opinion which
deserves to be repeated in full because it represents a prejudice that we
must be vigilant against, Bradley stated:
[T]he civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide
difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman.
Man is, or should be, woman’s protector and defender. The natural
and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex
evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. The
constitution of the family organization, which is founded in the divine
ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates the domestic
sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and functions of
womanhood. The harmony, not to say identity, of interest and views
which belong, or should belong, to the family institution is repugnant
to the idea of a woman adopting a distinct and independent career from
that of her husband. So firmly fixed was this sentiment in the founders
of the common law that it became a maxim of that system of
jurisprudence that a woman had no legal existence separate from her
59. 83 U.S. 36, 71 (1873) (Miller, J.). Justice Miller stated:
[N]o one can fail to be impressed with the one pervading purpose found in them all,
lying at the foundation of each, and without which none of them would have been even
suggested; we mean the freedom of the slave race, the security and firm establishment of
that freedom, and the protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen from the
oppressions of those who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him.
Id.
60. Id. at 81.
61. See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141-42 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring in the
judgment).
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husband, who was regarded as her head and representative in the social
state; and, notwithstanding some recent modifications of this civil
status, many of the special rules of law flowing from and dependent
upon this cardinal principle still exist in full force in most States. One
of these is, that a married woman is incapable, without her husband’s
consent, of making contracts which shall be binding on her or him.
This very incapacity was one circumstance which the Supreme Court
of Illinois deemed important in rendering a married woman
incompetent fully to perform the duties and trusts that belong to the
office of an attorney and counsellor . . . .
The humane movements of modern society, which have for their object
the multiplication of avenues for woman's advancement, and of
occupations adapted to her condition and sex, have my heartiest
concurrence. But I am not prepared to say that it is one of her
fundamental rights and privileges to be admitted into every office and
position, including those which require highly special qualifications
and demanding special responsibilities. In the nature of things it is not
every citizen of every age, sex, and condition that is qualified for every
calling and position. It is the prerogative of the legislator to prescribe
regulations founded on nature, reason, and experience for the due
admission of qualified persons to professions and callings demanding
special skill and confidence. This fairly belongs to the police power of
the State; and, in my opinion, in view of the peculiar characteristics,
destiny, and mission of woman, it is within the province of the
legislature to ordain what offices, positions, and callings shall be filled
and discharged by men, and shall receive the benefit of those energies
and responsibilities, and that decision and firmness which are
presumed to predominate in the sterner sex.62

Justice Bradley’s reasoning relies primarily upon tradition (“the
civil law has always recognized a wide difference in the respective
spheres and destinies of man and woman”) and religious doctrine
(“founded in the divine ordinance”) in concluding that women should
not be permitted to serve as lawyers. It is this general jurisprudential
approach which continues to hamper and constrain analysis of the Equal
Protection Clause. Compare Justice Bradley’s reasoning in Bradwell
with that of Chief Justice Warren Burger a century later in Bowers v.
Hardwick,63 a gay rights case:

62. Id.
63. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding Texas law criminalizing oral and anal sex as applied to
same sex couples).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol42/iss4/3

14

Huhn: The Legacy of Slaughterhouse, Bradwell, and Cruikshank

HUHN_COPYFORPRINTER_FINAL.DOC

2009]

6/30/2009 3:35 PM

THE LEGACY OF SLAUGHTERHOUSE, BRADWELL, AND CRUIKSHANK

1065

As the Court notes, the proscriptions against sodomy have very
“ancient roots.” Decisions of individuals relating to homosexual
conduct have been subject to state intervention throughout the history
of Western civilization. Condemnation of those practices is firmly
rooted in Judeao-Christian moral and ethical standards. Homosexual
sodomy was a capital crime under Roman law. See Code Theod. 9.7.6;
Code Just. 9.9.31. See also D. Bailey, Homosexuality and the Western
Christian Tradition 70-81 (1975). During the English Reformation
when powers of the ecclesiastical courts were transferred to the King’s
Courts, the first English statute criminalizing sodomy was passed. 25
Hen. VIII, ch. 6. Blackstone described “the infamous crime against
nature” as an offense of “deeper malignity” than rape, a heinous act
“the very mention of which is a disgrace to human nature,” and “a
crime not fit to be named.” The common law of England, including its
prohibition of sodomy, became the received law of Georgia and the
other Colonies. In 1816 the Georgia Legislature passed the statute at
issue here, and that statute has been continuously in force in one form
or another since that time. To hold that the act of homosexual sodomy
is somehow protected as a fundamental right would be to cast aside
millennia of moral teaching.64

Compare, as well, Justice Scalia’s reasoning from his dissenting
opinion in United States v. Virginia,65 where he argued that the
Commonwealth of Virginia had the right to exclude women from
attending a prestigious state university. Justice Scalia commenced his
opinion with an inaccurate charge and an appeal to history: “Today the
Court shuts down an institution that has served the people of the
Commonwealth of Virginia with pride and distinction for over a century
and a half.”66 The Supreme Court, of course, did not “shut down” the
Virginia Military Institute, it merely ordered the Commonwealth of
Virginia to admit women to the Institute.67 Justice Scalia repeatedly
invoked “tradition” as justifying the state’s egregious gender
discrimination, for example stating, “[the Court] counts for nothing the
long tradition, enduring down to the present, of men’s military colleges
supported by both States and the Federal Government.”68 Justice Scalia
closed his opinion with a long quotation from “The Code of the
Gentleman,” a booklet that VMI students had been required to keep in
64. Id. at 196-97 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
65. 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (striking down official policy barring women from Virginia Military
Institute).
66. Id. at 566 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 557 (Ginsburg, J.).
68. Id. at 566 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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their possession at all times.69 This booklet, which Justice Scalia
apparently found reflected a tradition of “manly honor,”70 was filled with
romanticized notions of etiquette towards women:
A Gentleman . . . Does not speak more than casually about his girl
friend. Does not go to a lady’s house if he is affected by alcohol. . . .
Does not hail a lady from a club window. . . . [N]ever discusses the
merits or demerits of a lady. . . . Does not . . . so much as lay a finger
on a lady . . . .”71

Justice Scalia concluded:
I do not know whether the men of VMI lived by this code; perhaps not.
But it is powerfully impressive that a public institution of higher
education still in existence sought to have them do so. I do not think
any of us, women included, will be better off for its destruction.”72

In his opinion in the VMI case, Justice Scalia summarized his
approach to constitutional analysis in this brief statement: “It is my
position that the term ‘fundamental rights’ should be limited to
‘interest[s] traditionally protected by our society.’”73 More specifically,
Justice Scalia explained:
[I]n my view the function of this Court is to preserve our society's
values regarding (among other things) equal protection, not to revise
them; to prevent backsliding from the degree of restriction the
Constitution imposed upon democratic government, not to prescribe,
on our own authority, progressively higher degrees. For that reason it
is my view that, whatever abstract tests we may choose to devise, they
cannot supersede – and indeed ought to be crafted so as to reflect –
those constant and unbroken national traditions that embody the
people’s understanding of ambiguous constitutional texts. More
specifically, it is my view that “when a practice not expressly
prohibited by the text of the Bill of Rights bears the endorsement of a
long tradition of open, widespread, and unchallenged use that dates
back to the beginning of the Republic, we have no proper basis for
striking it down.”74

The “tradition” approach favored by Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Scalia is entirely consistent with Justice Bradley’s reasoning in
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 601-02.
Id. at 601.
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 602-03 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 603.
Id. at 567.
Id. at 568.
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Bradwell. Traditional understandings of liberty and equality effectively
strangle emerging constitutional claims by groups which have been
traditionally discriminated against such as gays and women. Similarly,
tradition was also used to justify racial segregation in Plessy v.
Ferguson,75 where the Court stated that in determining whether or not
people could be segregated by race on trains, the State of Louisiana was
entitled to act in accordance with “the established usages, customs, and
traditions of the people.”76
It took 98 years for the Supreme Court to rectify its decision in
Bradwell. As late as 1948, the Court sustained a state law that
prohibited a woman from working in a tavern unless the tavern was
owned by her husband or her father.77 The first time that the Supreme
Court found any law to be in violation of the Equal Protection Clause
because it discriminated on the basis of gender was 1971, in the case of
Reed v. Reed.78 Other groups who have been traditionally discriminated
against waited even longer for the Court to acknowledge their equality.
Not until 1996 did the Court for the first time strike down a law because
it discriminated against people on the basis of sexual orientation,79 and
not until 2003 did the Court finally invalidate state laws making
homosexuality a crime.80
A majority of the Supreme Court has now rejected the “tradition”
approach to defining constitutional rights advocated by Justice Bradley
in Bradwell, Justice Brown in Plessy, Chief Justice Burger in Bowers,

75. 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding Louisiana statute requiring segregation of the races on
trains).
76. Id. at 550. The Court stated:
So far, then, as a conflict with the fourteenth amendment [sic] is concerned, the case
reduces itself to the question whether the statute of Louisiana is a reasonable regulation,
and with respect to this there must necessarily be a large discretion on the part of the
legislature. In determining the question of reasonableness, it is at liberty to act with
reference to the established usages, customs, and traditions of the people, and with a
view to the promotion of their comfort, and the preservation of the public peace and
good order.
Id.
77. See Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (upholding Michigan law prohibiting women
from working as a bartender in a tavern unless they were “the wife or daughter of the male owner”).
78. 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (striking down Idaho statute which favored males over females in the
appointment of administrators of estates).
79. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (striking down Colorado constitutional
amendment prohibiting the adoption of laws or official policies directed against discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation).
80. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down Texas statute making oral and
anal sex between persons of the same gender a crime).
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and Justice Scalia in VMI.81 Justice Anthony Kennedy has stated,
“[H]istory and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the
ending point of the substantive due process inquiry.”82 Justice O’Connor
has stated that she would not “foreclose the unanticipated” by adopting a
strictly historical approach to constitutional analysis.83 In Lawrence v.
Texas, the Court expressly adopted the language proposed by Justice
Stevens from his Bowers dissent, stating:
[T]he fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally
viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for
upholding a law prohibiting the practice; neither history nor tradition
could save a law prohibiting miscegenation from constitutional
attack.84

In place of tradition the Supreme Court has adopted a realistic
standard for defining the concepts of “liberty” and “equality” under the
Constitution. In defining “liberty,” the Court now takes two factors into
account: (1) How important is this behavior in the life of the individual –
how “intimate and personal” is that choice? and (2) How much harm is
this behavior likely to cause?85 The principal definition of “liberty” was
given expression by Justice Kennedy in Lawrence v. Texas:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a
person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and
autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery
of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the
attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the
State.86

81. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 567 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(acknowledging that the majority of the Court does not agree with his tradition approach).
82. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572 (Kennedy, J.) (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523
U.S. 833, 857 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
83. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 132 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part) (“I
would not foreclose the unanticipated by the prior imposition of a single mode of historical
analysis.”).
84. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577-78 (Kennedy, J.) (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,
216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
85. See id. at 572, 577-78.
86. Id. at 574 (Kennedy, J.) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.)).
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Justice Kennedy also took particular care to imply that the activity
upon which the claim of constitutional right was centered must not be
causing harm:
The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons
who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships
where consent might not easily be refused. It does not involve public
conduct or prostitution.87

Similarly, constitutional standards regarding equality are no longer
based primarily upon tradition and certainly not upon religious
teachings.88 The legal standard that comes closest to a realistic
definition of equality was first announced in 1885 in the case of Barbier
v. Connelly,89 in which the Court stated:
Class legislation, discriminating against some and favoring others, is
prohibited; but legislation which, in carrying out a public purpose, is
limited in its application, if within the sphere of its operation it affects
alike all persons similarly situated, is not within the amendment.90

A year later, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins,91 the Supreme Court quoted
this language and applied this principle in ruling that the City of San
Francisco acted illegally when it denied permits to operate laundries to
persons of Chinese extraction.92 The “similarly situated test” from this
case has been widely quoted and used in Equal Protection cases.93 Even
Justice William Rehnquist agreed in his opinions that the constitutional
principle of equality demands that “persons [who are] similarly situated
should be treated similarly.”94

87. Id. at 578.
88. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 211-12 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“A
State can no more punish private behavior because of religious intolerance than it can punish such
behavior because of racial animus.”).
89. 113 U.S. 27 (1885).
90. Id. at 32.
91. 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (striking down discriminatory enforcement of municipal ordinance
issuing permits for the operation of laundries).
92. Id. at 368.
93. See id. at 373-74.
94. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 780 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice
Rehnquist stated:
In the case of equality and equal protection, the constitutional principle – the thing to be
protected to a greater or lesser degree – is not even identifiable from within the four
corners of the Constitution. For equal protection does not mean that all persons must be
treated alike. Rather, its general principle is that persons similarly situated should be
treated similarly.
Id. at 779-80.
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In his concurring opinion in Railway Express Agency v. New
York,95 Justice Robert Jackson illustrated how to apply this realistic
approach to Equal Protection questions. The issue in that case
concerned the constitutionality of a municipal ordinance which
prohibited the operation of motor vehicles on the streets of New York
solely for the purposes of advertising.96 The law permitted advertising
on vehicles which were operated for other purposes.97 Justice Jackson
gave the following reason for joining the decision of the majority
upholding the law:
The question in my mind comes to this. Where individuals contribute
to an evil or danger in the same way and to the same degree, may those
who do so for hire be prohibited, while those who do so for their own
commercial ends but not for hire be allowed to continue? I think the
answer has to be that the hireling may be put in a class by himself and
may be dealt with differently than those who act on their own. But this
is not merely because such a discrimination will enable the lawmaker
to diminish the evil. That might be done by many classifications,
which I should think wholly unsustainable. It is rather because there is
a real difference between doing in self-interest and doing for hire, so
that it is one thing to tolerate action from those who act on their own
and it is another thing to permit the same action to be promoted for a
price.98

The “real differences” test articulated by Justice Jackson is simply
the reverse side of the “similarly situated” coin. Groups of persons who
are similarly situated must be treated similarly. Groups of persons may
be treated differently only if there are “real differences” between them,
and only if those differences “have an appropriate relation to the object
of the legislation or ordinance.”99
In the interpretation of the Constitution, we now stand on firmer
ground than did the Court in Slaughterhouse, Bradwell, Plessy, and
Bowers. Tradition is still an important consideration in constitutional
analysis, but it is not the only determinant, nor is it controlling. In
assessing our constitutionally protected sphere of liberty to engage in
certain activity, in addition to tradition, we look to the importance of the
activity to the individual as well as to the harm that may result from the
95. 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (upholding municipal ordinance regulating advertisements on
vehicles against equal protection challenge).
96. Id. at 107.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 115-16 (Jackson, J., concurring).
99. Id. at 115 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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individual’s actions. In defining equality, we consider not only tradition
but also whether the group of people whom the law is treating differently
is similar to or different from other groups in the context of the law
being challenged. Most importantly, we no longer regard fundamental
rights to liberty and equality as aspects of state citizenship rather than
national citizenship. No longer are the States considered to be the
repositories, and more frequently the graveyards, of human rights.
In the third case which is the subject of this conference, United
States v. Cruikshank, the Supreme Court inflicted even more damage to
the Constitution and to the cause of human rights than it had in
Slaughterhouse and Bradwell. The Court reached an even more unjust
result, and its reasoning was even more twisted. The discussion of
Cruikshank follows.
IV. UNITED STATES V. CRUIKSHANK
This case weighed an appeal from the conviction of three
individuals on federal charges resulting from the mass murder known as
the Colfax Massacre.100 The underlying facts of the case and the
miscarriage of justice that the Supreme Court authored in their opinion
reversing the defendants’ convictions are ably set forth in Charles Lane’s
The Day Freedom Died: The Colfax Massacre, The Supreme Court and
the Betrayal of Reconstruction.101
Briefly, following the election of 1872, the Democratic Party of
Louisiana attempted to steal the election by means of fraud and
intimidation.102 The Republican Party – African-Americans and their
supporters – resisted these efforts in one parish by occupying the
courthouse in Colfax.103 On April 13, 1873, a large mob of whites
attacked the courthouse and killed over 60 persons, mostly AfricanAmericans, in cold blood, most of them after they surrendered.104 Only

100. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 548-49 (1876).
101. CHARLES LANE, THE DAY FREEDOM DIED: THE COLFAX MASSACRE, THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE BETRAYAL OF RECONSTRUCTION (2008).
102. See id. at 65-66.
103. See id. at 70.
104. See Charles Lane, To Keep and Bear Arms, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 2008, at A13,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/21/AR200803210
2540.html; see also Leslie Friedman Goldstein, The Second Amendment, the Slaughter-House
Cases, and United States v. Cruikshank, 1 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 365, 387 (2008) (stating that
between 100 and 400 individuals were killed in the attack).
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three of the attackers were convicted,105 and these three were not
convicted of murder but rather for violating a statute which Congress
had enacted in 1870 that made it a crime for individuals to conspire to
interfere with any rights of American citizens under the Constitution or
under federal laws.106 The Supreme Court reversed the defendants’
convictions under this statute because the indictments failed to
sufficiently allege that the defendants violated rights protected under the
Constitution or laws of the United States.107
The Court began its consideration of the legality of the indictments
and resulting convictions with an extended discussion of the principal
theory that it had announced in Slaughterhouse and applied in Bradwell
– the distinction between state and national citizenship.108 The Court
stated:
We have in our political system a government of the United States and
a government of each of the several States. Each one of these
governments is distinct from the others, and each has citizens of its
own who owe it allegiance, and whose rights, within its jurisdiction, it
must protect. The same person may be at the same time a citizen of
the United States and a citizen of a State, but his rights of citizenship
under one of these governments will be different from those he has
under the other.109

The Court elaborated upon this theory and concluded that citizens
might seek the federal government’s protection from encroachments on
their national rights, but they must seek the state government’s
protection from violations of their rights derived from state
citizenship.110
105. See Lane, supra note 104 (“No one was ever punished for the Colfax Massacre. [U.S.
Attorney James] Beckwith secured only three convictions, and they were later overturned by the
Supreme Court in one of the worst miscarriages of justice in American history.”).
106. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 548 (1876) (quoting Section 6 of the federal
Enforcement Act of 1870). The Act provided:
That if two or more persons shall band or conspire together, or go in disguise upon the
public highway, or upon the premises of another, with intent to violate any provision of
this act, or to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen, with intent to prevent or
hinder his free exercise and enjoyment of any right or privilege granted or secured to him
by the constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having exercised the
same, such persons shall be held guilty of felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be
fined or imprisoned, or both, at the discretion of the court . . . .
Id.
107. See id. at 551-57.
108. See id. at 549-51.
109. Id. at 549.
110. See id. at 551. The Court concluded:
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The trial court convicted defendants on sixteen counts of the
indictment which consisted of eight different charges relating to two
victims of the massacre.111 The first and ninth counts of the indictment
charged the defendants with interfering with the victims’ right to
peaceably assemble.112 The Supreme Court concluded that Congress
lacked the authority to protect this particular right because it was a
matter which was committed to the States:
The first amendment to the Constitution prohibits Congress from
abridging ‘the right of the people to assemble and to petition the
government for a redress of grievances.’ This, like the other
amendments proposed and adopted at the same time, was not intended
to limit the powers of the State governments in respect to their own
citizens, but to operate upon the National government alone . . . . They
left the authority of the States just where they found it, and added
nothing to the already existing powers of the United States.
The particular amendment now under consideration assumes the
existence of the right of the people to assemble for lawful purposes,
and protects it against encroachment by Congress. The right was not
created by the amendment; neither was its continuance guaranteed,
except as against congressional interference. For their protection in its
enjoyment, therefore, the people must look to the States. The power
for that purpose was originally placed there, and it has never been
surrendered to the United States.113

The third and eleventh counts of the indictment alleged that the
defendants conspired to deprive the victims of life and liberty without
due process of law.114 At this point, the Court, for the first time in
constitutional history, invoked what has become known as the “state
action” doctrine. The Court based this theory upon the previous
distinction it constructed between state and national citizenship. The
Court stated:

The government of the United States is one of delegated powers alone. Its authority is
defined and limited by the Constitution. All powers not granted to it by that instrument
are reserved to the States or the people. No rights can be acquired under the constitution
or laws of the United States, except such as the government of the United States has the
authority to grant or secure. All that cannot be so granted or secured are left under the
protection of the States.
Id.
111.
112.
113.
114.
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The very highest duty of the States, when they entered into the Union
under the Constitution, was to protect all persons within their
boundaries in the enjoyment of these ‘unalienable rights with which
they were endowed by their Creator.’ Sovereignty, for this purpose,
rests alone with the States. It is no more the duty or within the power
of the United States to punish for a conspiracy to falsely imprison or
murder within a State, than it would be to punish for false
imprisonment or murder itself.
The fourteenth amendment (sic) prohibits a State from depriving any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; but this
adds nothing to the rights of one citizen as against another. It simply
furnishes an additional guaranty against any encroachment by the
States upon the fundamental rights which belong to every citizen as a
member of society.115

In essence, the Court ruled that the defendants’ convictions had to
be reversed because the conduct of the defendants constituted private
action and not state action. Accordingly, it was for the States, and not
the federal government, to punish their behavior.
Other scholars and I have written about how the Framers of the
14th Amendment were, in fact, primarily concerned with addressing the
practices of racial discrimination by private parties and the many acts of
private violence being visited upon blacks and their white allies in the
South116 – how Congress enacted statute after statute prohibiting that
discrimination and punishing that violence117 – and how Congress
adopted the 14th Amendment with the avowed purpose of making that

115. Id. at 553-54.
116. See B.F. Butler, To Protect Loyal and Peaceable Citizens of the United States, H.R. Rep.
No. 41-37, at 1-4 (1871) (describing dozens of assaults and murders of blacks and their white allies
across the South). The Report stated:
If . . . the State is powerless to prevent such murders and felonies . . . from being daily
and hourly committed . . . , and if, added to that, comes the inability of the State to
punish the crimes after they are committed, then the State has, by its neglect or want of
power, deprived the citizens of the United States of protection in the enjoyment of life,
liberty, and property. . . .
Id. at 4.
117. See Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982
(2000)) (originally entitled “An Act to protect All Persons in the United States in Their Civil Rights,
and furnish the Means of their Vindication”); Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1985, 18 U.S.C. § 241 (2000)) (originally entitled “An Act to enforce the
Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and for other
Purposes”); Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, §§ 3-5, 18 Stat. 335 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1984
(2000)) (originally entitled “An act to protect all citizens in their civil and legal rights”).
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legislation constitutional.118 After all of their efforts – after the terrible
struggle of the Civil War and the immense suffering their generation
endured to bring a new birth of freedom to America119 – the Supreme
Court struck down the Civil Rights Acts adopted by the Reconstruction
Congress on the ground that Congress lacked authority to punish the acts
of private parties.
The Court’s ruling on state action in Cruikshank certainly did not
accord with the understanding of the Framers. The Republican members
of Congress articulated this principal theory: “Allegiance and protection
are reciprocal rights.”120 They believed that citizens owe allegiance to
their government because (and to the extent that) the government affords
them protection.121 The Framers of the 14th Amendment enacted
118. See infra notes 120-122 and accompanying text.
119. See, e.g., Abraham Lincoln, President, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 5, 1865). Lincoln
stated:
One-eighth of the whole population were colored slaves, not distributed generally over
the Union, but localized in the southern part of it. These slaves constituted a peculiar
and powerful interest. All knew that this interest was somehow the cause of the war. To
strengthen, perpetuate, and extend this interest was the object for which the insurgents
would rend the Union even by war, while the Government claimed no right to do more
than to restrict the territorial enlargement of it. Neither party expected for the war the
magnitude or the duration which it has already attained . . . .
Id.
120. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1757 (1866) (statement of Sen. Lyman Trumball,
floor manager of the Fourteenth Amendment). Trumball said:
How is it that every person born in these United States owes allegiance to the
Government? . . . [C]an it be that our ancestors struggled through a long war and set up
this Government, and that the people of our day have struggled through another war,
with all its sacrifices and all its desolation, to maintain it, and at last that we have got a
Government which is all-powerful to command the obedience of the citizen, but has no
power to afford him protection? . . . Sir, it cannot be. Such is not the meaning of our
Constitution. Such is not the meaning of American citizenship. This government, . . .
has certainly some power to protect its own citizens in their own country. Allegiance
and protection are reciprocal rights.
Id.
121. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1263 (1866) (remarks of Rep. John H.
Broomal). Broomal said:
But throwing aside the letter of the Constitution, there are characteristics of
Governments that belong to them as such, without which they would cease to be
Governments. The rights and duties of allegiance and protection are corresponding
rights and duties. Upon whatever square foot of the earth’s surface I owe allegiance to
my country, there it owes me protection, and wherever my Government owes me no
protection I owe it no allegiance and can commit no treason.
Id. A leading congressional Republican quoted Daniel Webster, a leading Whig and ardent
Unionist, for the proposition that there is a reciprocal relation between “allegiance” and
“protection.” See Cong. Globe, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 85 (1871) (John Bingham quoted Daniel
Webster as having said, “[t]he maintenance of the Constitution does not depend on the plighted faith
of the States as States to support it . . . . It relies on individual duty and obligation. . . . On the other
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legislation to protect American citizens in their fundamental rights from
interference either by the states or by private parties, and they adopted
Section 5 of the 14th Amendment to remove any possible doubts about
the constitutionality of that legislation.122 The Supreme Court rejected
the Framers’ political philosophy when they ruled that the States, and
not the national government, had responsibility for protecting citizens in
their fundamental rights. The Court betrayed the intent of the Framers
when they declared the civil rights laws enacted by the Reconstruction
Congress unconstitutional.123
The Cruikshank Court found that other counts of the indictment
similarly failed to allege that the defendants deprived the victims of any
federal rights. For example, the Court ruled that separate charges of the
indictment were insufficient because they neglected to specify whether
the defendants assaulted the victims because they voted in elections for
national office as opposed to elections for state office,124 or because the
indictments failed to allege that the defendants assaulted the victims
“because of the race or color of the persons conspired against.”125 The

hand, the Government owes high and solemn duties to every citizen of the country. It is bound to
protect him in his most important rights and interests.”). See also DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA
SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 430-33 (2d ed. 2005) (describing the
Republican Party’s linkage of allegiance and protection); Rebecca E. Zietlow, Congressional
Enforcement of Civil Rights and John Bingham’s Theory of Citizenship, 36 AKRON L. REV. 717,
740 (2003); Alan R. Madry, State Action and the Due Process of Self-Help; Flagg Bros. Redux, 62
U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 40 (2000); Wilson Huhn, The State Action Doctrine and the Principle of
Democratic Choice, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1379, 1403-04 (2006).
122. See, e.g., Steven J. Heyman, The First Duty of Government: Protection, Liberty, and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 41 DUKE L.J. 507, 553-54 (1991) (noting that John Bingham, the leading
drafter of the Fourteenth Amendment, and other Republicans, considered the adoption of the
Amendment as ensuring the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1866); see also Aynes,
supra note 15, at 631; Richard L. Aynes, The Continuing Importance of John A. Bingham and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 36 AKRON L. REV. 589, 610 (2003); FRANK J. SCATURRO, THE SUPREME
COURT’S RETREAT FROM RECONSTRUCTION: A DISTORTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE
78-79 (2000).
123. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 26-27 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (taking the
position that the majority of the Court had erred in striking down the Civil Rights Act of 1875 on
state action grounds and stating, “the court has departed from the familiar rule requiring, in the
interpretation of constitutional provisions, that full effect be given to the intent with which they
were adopted.”). See generally Huhn, supra note 121, at 1430-43 (assembling authorities
supporting the proposition that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended to clothe
Congress with the authority to prohibit individuals from interfering with the fundamental rights of
American citizens).
124. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 556 (1875) (“There is nothing to show that the
elections voted at were any other than State elections . . . .”).
125. Id. at 554.
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Court also found that some charges of the indictment were
unconstitutionally vague.126
The cruel and heedless result reached by the Court in Cruikshank
signaled open season on blacks and other racial minorities.127 The
decision in Cruikshank prevented the federal government from
protecting black voters from violence. This initiated a shameful period
in American history – the Jim Crow era – in which the Court was fully
complicit.128 In numerous decisions between 1896 and 1927, the Court
narrowly construed the constitutional rights of African-Americans and
other racial and ethnic minorities, upholding state laws that fostered
racial segregation and other discriminatory policies.129 Not only did the
Court refuse to enforce the principle of equality implicit in the Equal
Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment, but it also refused to let
Congress enforce this principle. In some cases the Court misconstrued
federal civil rights legislation as it had in Cruikshank.130 In other cases
the Court simply declared federal civil rights laws unconstitutional,
usually invoking the state action doctrine it had formulated in

126. Id. at 557-59.
127. See
Douglas
Linder,
Lynchings:
By
State
and
Race,
1882-1968,
http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/shipp/lynchingsstate.html (last visited Jan. 31,
2009) (citing statistics provided by the Archives at Tuskegee Institute showing large numbers of
lynchings in the period following Cruikshank); C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF
JIM CROW 43 (1966) (“[I]t was, after all, in the ’eighties and early ’nineties [of the 19th century]
that lynching attained the most staggering proportions ever reached in the history of that crime.”);
see also GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 560-61 (1944) (describing lynching in
America, almost all of which occurred in the southern and border states); Douglas Linder, The Trial
of Joseph Schipp, et al.: An Account, http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/
ftrials/shipp/trialaccount.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2009) (describing the 1906 lynching of Ed
Johnson in Tennessee and the subsequent trial of Sheriff Joseph Schipp and other members of the
mob in the United States Supreme Court for criminal contempt).
128. See WOODWARD, supra note 127, at 70-71 (“[T]he cumulative weakening of resistance to
racism was expressed also in a succession of decisions by the United States Supreme Court between
1873 and 1898 . . . .”).
129. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding Louisiana statute requiring
separate railroad cars for blacks and whites); Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898)
(upholding provisions of Mississippi constitution and laws such as poll tax, literacy test,
disqualification for certain crimes, and residency requirements, which were designed to disqualify
African-Americans from voting); Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927) (upholding Mississippi
statute requiring separation of the races in the public schools).
130. See Blyew v. United States, 80 U.S. 581 (1872) (Strong, J.) (giving Section 3 of Civil
Rights Act of 1866 narrow construction, denying jurisdiction of federal court to hear murder case
where Kentucky law prohibited blacks from testifying as witnesses to crimes committed by whites,
viz., the murder of an elderly black woman witnessed by members of her family); United States v.
Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876) (Waite, C.J.) (construing Section 3 of the first Enforcement Act broadly,
so as to render it unconstitutional as beyond Congress’s power to enact under the Fifteenth
Amendment).
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Cruikshank.131 By this series of decisions the Court enabled statesponsored segregation,132 inferior educational programs,133 “antimiscegenation” statutes,134 lynching,135 and loss of the right to vote136 for
African-Americans.
Not until 1938 did the Supreme Court, fortified with two justices
newly appointed by Franklin Delano Roosevelt,137 begin to strike down
the system of state-sponsored segregation that the Court had helped to

131. See Harris v. United States, 106 U.S. 629, 640 (1883) (Wood, J.) (declaring provision of
Ku Klux Klan Act unconstitutional). Justice Wood stated:
As, therefore, the section of the law under consideration is directed exclusively against
the action of private persons, without reference to the laws of the State or their
administration by her officers, we are clear in the opinion that it is not warranted by any
clause in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.
Id.; see also The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (striking down federal Civil Rights Act of
1875); Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678 (1887) (following Harris in finding the Ku Klux Klan Act
to be unconstitutional insofar as it applies to private action); Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 14
(1906) (Brewer, J.) (overturning convictions of a group of individuals for interfering with the civil
rights of other individuals in violation of Civil Rights Act of 1866, in part because the statute could
not be grounded upon the Fourteenth Amendment, stating, “that the 14th and 15th Amendments do
not justify the legislation is also beyond dispute, for they, as repeatedly held, are restrictions upon
state action, and no action on the part of the state is complained of.”); United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598 (2000) (striking down federal Violence Against Women Act as applied to private acts
of gender violence).
132. See WOODWARD, supra note 127, at 145 (stating that in the early 1950s “[s]egregation
was required by law in the schools of seventeen states and the District of Columbia, permitted by
local option in four, prohibited by law in sixteen, and eleven states had no laws on the subject.”).
133. See id. (stating that in the early 1950s “in many areas Negro schools were disgracefully
behind schools for whites.”); see also Cumming v. Bd. of Educ. of Richmond County, 175 U.S. 528
(1899) (refusing to issue an injunction against local authorities who had closed the separate
secondary school for African-Americans while continuing to operate a school for white students).
134. See Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883) (upholding the constitutionality of a state law
that punished interracial marriage or living arrangements). The law provided:
[I]f any white person and any negro, or the descendant of any negro to the third
generation, inclusive, though one ancestor of each generation was a white person,
intermarry or live in adultery or fornication with each other, each of them must, on
conviction, be imprisoned in the penitentiary or sentenced to hard labor for the county
for not less than two nor more than seven years.
Id. at 583.
135. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
136. See WOODWARD, supra note 127, at 71 (“[I]n Williams v. Mississippi the Court completed
the opening of the legal road to proscription, segregation, and disenfranchisement by approving the
Mississippi plan for depriving Negroes of the franchise.”).
137. Hugo Black joined the Court on August 19, 1937, and Stanley Reed was added on January
31, 1938. See Oyez Project, Hugo L. Black Biography, http://www.oyez.org/justices /hugo_l_black
(last
visited
Jan.
31,
2009);
Oyez
Project,
Stanley
Reed
Biography,
http://www.oyez.org/justices/stanley_reed (last visited Jan. 31, 2009); see also Oyez Project,
http://www.oyez.org/courts/warren/war1 (last visited Jan. 31, 2009) (listing Justices from the first
term of the Warren Court).
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erect.138 Not until 1954 did the Supreme Court, with five members
appointed by Roosevelt,139 declare “separate but equal” to be inherently
unequal and unconstitutional.140 And not until 1964 did Congress enact
and the Supreme Court uphold major civil rights legislation, this time
under the Commerce Clause.141
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Slaughterhouse, Bradwell, and
Cruikshank had a devastating effect on human rights under the
Constitution. Our basic liberties were placed at the mercy of state laws
and state officials. Equality was defined primarily by reference to
tradition, a tradition which was all too often intolerant. And Congress
was prevented from enacting legislation that would have protected
people in their basic rights.
Thank goodness the reasoning of those cases has largely been
circumvented or overruled. Even though Slaughterhouse emasculated
the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the evolving doctrine of
Substantive Due Process has served to make both the Bill of Rights and
the Right to Privacy effective against the States.142 Even though
Slaughterhouse and Bradwell eviscerated the Equal Protection Clause,
limiting its application to race alone and defining equality as no more
than traditional conceptions of human potential, today Equal Protection
applies to all classes of persons and equality is measured realistically by
reference to how similar or how different groups of people really are.
Furthermore, our right to liberty is also no longer limited by tradition but

138. See Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (ordering the School of Law
of the State University of Missouri to admit an African-American student).
139. Hugo Black, Stanley Reed, Felix Frankfurter, Robert Jackson, and William Douglas were
all appointed by Roosevelt and were still members of the Court in May 1954. See Oyez Project,
http://www.oyez.org/courts/warren/war1 (last visited Jan. 31, 2009) (listing Justices from the first
term of the Warren Court).
140. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (“We conclude that in the field of
public education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place.”).
141. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding
Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause to enact the Civil Rights Act of 1964); see also
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
142. See David Bogen, Mr. Justice Miller’s Clause: The Privileges or Immunities of Citizens of
the United States Internationally, 56 DRAKE L. REV. 1051, 1053-54 (2008) (“The Supreme Court is
unlikely to alter Justice Miller’s interpretation of the Clause because overturning it would serve
little purpose. By interpreting the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses broadly to attack racial
discrimination, to enforce guarantees of the Bill of Rights against the States, and to apply
fundamental rights limitations, the Court has achieved the results that an expansive reading of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause would reach.”).
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rather depends upon how important an activity is to an individual and
whether that activity is causing harm.
As Thurgood Marshall
admonished in United States v. Kras,143 “[i]t is perfectly proper for
judges to disagree about what the Constitution requires. But it is
disgraceful for an interpretation of the Constitution to be premised upon
unfounded assumptions about how people live.”144 Finally, although the
Supreme Court in Cruikshank commenced its vocation of narrowly
interpreting and striking down civil rights acts as unauthorized under
Section 5 of the 14th Amendment, Congress has found other
constitutional sources of authority besides the 14th Amendment which
authorize it to adopt civil rights legislation. The baneful legacy of
Slaughterhouse, Bradwell, and Cruikshank has nearly run its course.

143. 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
144. Id. at 460 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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